It has not yet been confirmed why the aircraft had diverted to near Aktau. Weather reports for Grozny at the time indicated visibility at the airfield was 3600 meters with low overcast clouds, but it is not yet known if this was a factor.
URMG 250600Z 18001MPS 2900 BR OVC004 03/02 Q1025 R26/290250 NOSIG RMK MT OBSC OBST OBSC QFE754/1006
URMG 250530Z 16001MPS 3500 BR OVC012 03/02 Q1025 R26/290250 NOSIG RMK OBST OBSC QFE754/1005
URMG 250430Z 26001MPS 3600 BR OVC007 03/02 Q1025 R26/290250 NOSIG RMK MT OBSC OBST OBSC QFE754/1005
URMG 250400Z 25002MPS 3600 BR OVC006 03/02 Q1025 R26/290250 NOSIG RMK MT OBSC OBST OBSC QFE753/1005
Variable altitude, speed, and vertical rate
While data was not received for the entire flight, the ADS-B data available from 05:13 UTC demonstrates variable altitude (feet AMSL) reports of ±8,000 feet dozens of times and oscillating ground speed (Knots) and vertical rate (feet per minute) values. The aircraft was unable to maintain consistent altitude and speed for at least 75 minutes. Photos and video from the crash scene indicate puncture damage to at least the left side of the vertical stabilizer.
Correcting for local pressure
Altitude data contained in ADS-B messages is transmitted at Standard pressure (1013.25 hPa). When aircraft fly at lower altitudes, pilots enter the QNH or local pressure into their flight computers, which computes a corrected altitude. To better visualize the flight data from J28243, we have corrected the ADS-B altitude data for the flight with QNH reported by Aktau Airport (SCO | UATE) at the time to 1025 hPa.
UATE 250600Z 03005MPS 9999 BKN036 04/M01 Q1025 NOSIG RMK QFE767/1023
Correcting to local pressure provides a 329 foot increase in the altitude values reported via ADS-B. This is also the reason why there are negative altitude values in the granular data (downloadable below).
Download flight data
ADS-B data is available for download. The granular data file contains the ADS-B data received from the aircraft at a higher rate of reporting than shown on the Flightradar24 site. Additionally, the granular file also contains data for frames that do not contain position updates.
Annotated and inferred flight path
Using the raw ADS-B data we have compiled a fuller picture of the possible flight path of J28243. The valid ADS-B data was sent in two sections, with a long interruption of position data in between. From take off at 03:55 UTC to 04:25 UTC we received valid ADS-B data including position updates. At 04:25 position data was no longer sent by the aircraft, but from 04:25 to 04:37, heading data continued to be sent, allowing us to plot the aircraft’s position for that time period (yellow line in the image).
Between 04:37 and 05:13, the aircraft sent a combination of spoofed position data (green data in the far left center of the image) and no data.
From 05:13 the flight resumed sending data in a degraded mode—a now common occurrence after an aircraft is subject to GPS interference. Data during this period did not include position updates.
At 06:07 the aircraft began sending valid ADS-B data, including position updates. Using the position update from 06:07 and the timestamped heading and indicated airspeed data received between 05:13 and 06:07, we have calculated a probable flight path using reverse dead reckoning. This is the first time we have conducted such an analysis of the data and we are continuing to explore what further analysis may be possible. We welcome feedback at this point.
Aircraft information
Azerbaijan Airlines flight J28243 was operated by an Embraer E190-100IGW registered 4K-AZ65. The E190 was powered by two CF-34 engines. Azerbaijan Airlines took delivery of plane in 2013.
Investigative updates
On 4 February 2025, the Kazakhstan Ministry of Transport released a preliminary report on the accident. The report, linked below is in Russian. At this time, it is not know if there is an official English translation. To that end, we have processed a machine translated copy of portions of the report for discussion. Note that any discrepancies between the translated copy and the original should give deference to the original.
Summary of preliminary report
The preliminary report provides significant details on the timing of events, the communications between the pilots and air traffic control, and the state of the aircraft as the pilots attempted to safely land.
The preliminary report confirms that the aircraft suffered catastrophic damage from an exterior force, disabling the E190’s hydraulics systems and forcing the crew to manage the aircraft on differential thrust alone.
Timeline of events (UTC)
03:55 Takeoff
04:36:50 Flight approaches Grozny, reports loss of both GPS, requests NDB approach
04:53:19 First go around announced by flight crew
05:11:42 Second go around announced by the flight crew, with intention to return to Baku
05:13:31 CVR records “sonic boom,” and audible alarm for disabling the autopilot (AI “AUTO PILOT”) and automatic throttle (AI “Throttle”) triggered.
05:13:34 Pressure in the 3rd hydraulic system drops to 0 PSI. The fluid level in the 3rd hydraulic system drops to 0%. Control surfaces (ELEVATOR, AILERON, RUDDER) are fixed in the zero (neutral) position and remain in this position until the end of the flight.
05:13:36 Aircraft pitch trim system failure recorded (AP PITCH TRIM NOT ENGAGED, MACH TRIM NOT CAPABLE).
05:13:39 FDR records beginning of cabin depressurization
05:13:47 “HYD 2 LOW PRESS” alarm triggered. Pressure in the 1st hydraulic system drops to 0 PSI. The fluid level in the 1st hydraulic system drops to 0%.
05:13:54 The pressure in the 2nd hydraulic system drops to 4 PSI.
05:13:56 CVR records a second “sonic boom.”
05:15:57 Captain reports a bird strike to Grozny controllers, requests assistance to nearest airport with good weather
05:16:54 Captain clarifies to controllers that a “strong explosion” occurred in the rear of the aircraft and the “rear seats exploded”. Announces intention to divert to Mineral Vody
Controllers provide vectors to turn toward Mineral Vody and the cabin altitude is increasing.
05:22:59 “…, we have lost hydraulics.”
05:23:11 The crew requests vectors to Makhachkala.
05:28:01 The crew announces their intention to continue to Baku.
The crew and ATC discuss the weather conditions at Baku and Makhachkala and confirm their decision to continue to Baku.
05:39:53 The crew provides a status update: “Confirming: remaining fuel 8,300 kg, both engines operational, but aileron and elevator control lost.”
05:41:30 ATC offers weather conditions at Aktau in Kazakhstan.
05:42:40 Crew confirms their intention to proceed to Aktau.
05:52:39 In response to ATC query, J28243 crew reports: “Situation: Oxygen running low in passenger cabin, likely an oxygen cylinder exploded. Some passengers are losing consciousness. Request permission to descend to a lower altitude.”
06:02:47 J28243 checks in with Aktau ATC: “Mayday, mayday, mayday! Azerbaijan eight two four three, Aktau Tower, good day. We have lost control surfaces and are managing the aircraft using thrust levers. Request emergency landing on Runway 11.”
06:19:13 (FDR): TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP sound alarm triggered.
06:22:20 FLAPS 1 selected
06:22:24 GEAR DOWN selected
06:22:40 FLAPS 2 selected
06:23:30 FLAPS 3 selected
06:24:52 (FDR): TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP sound alarm triggered.
06:25:25 (FDR): TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP sound alarm triggered.
06:27:58 The aircraft impacts the ground at 35 degrees right bank, -5.8 degrees pitch, in the configuration:
– Flaps/slats extended in position three (FLAPS 3);
– Landing gear extended, doors open;
– Stabilizer 1.76 UP.